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ABSTRACT
It has long been suggested that trade unions take actions and favor public policies that reduce
the quantity of labor so that union members might enjoy greater labor incomes.  Can this explain the
prevalence of generous public pension programs inducing retirement?  I suggest not, by formalizing
the monopoly unionism model and showing how labor’s interest in reducing the quantity of labor
cannot explain why the old are induced to retire rather than discouraging work among workers of
all ages.  Discouraging work of a subset of union workers introduces allocative inefficiencies without
promoting the objectives of the monopoly union.  And, unless the old have a disproportionate
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VII.  References ................................................................ 25A number of public policies – from income taxes to welfare programs – seem to discourage
work.  Perhaps this is unsurprising, since governments need to raise revenue, may want to assist
the poor, and may want to discourage work in order to raise the return to labor.  But governments
do the most to discourage work among the old even to the point of (implicitly) taxing elderly labor
income at 100% rates, and this is puzzling.
Can discouraging work among the elderly be understood as a relatively efficient way of
reducing aggregate labor supply, and hence a means for raising the return to labor?  I suggest not.
I formalize the monopoly unionism model, and use it to derive the well-known result that it can be
in labor’s interest to reduce the quantity of labor.  But, as compared to discouraging work among
workers of all ages, inducing retirement is an inferior method of reducing labor supply.  And, unless
the old have a disproportionate influence within the union, union interests cannot explain why
young workers would bear the burden of retirement subsidy programs.
Section I reviews some of the regularities of public pension programs: they encourage
retirement, they implicitly tax elderly work at the highest rates, and they use taxes on young
workers to finance pension benefits.  Moreover, public pensions like these have existed for decades,
and in a variety of different economies.  Section II builds a mathematical model of a monopoly
union facing a demand curve for the labor services of its members, showing how public pension
policies are much inferior to other strategies for reducing the supply of labor.  Sections III and IV
extend the model to the cases when some union labor is more complementary with nonunion
factors than others and when union density varies with age.  I conclude with a comparison of the
monopoly unionism model to some other positive theories of publicly induced retirement.
I.  An Overview of Retirement-Inducing Policies Around the World I.  An Overview of Retirement-Inducing Policies Around the World
There is a growing literature comparing public pension systems and their retirement
incentives across countries and over time.  I report some of the main results from that literature.Monopoly Unionism? - 2
1Data in this paragraph are reported and described in more detail by Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin (1999a,b) and Sala-i-Martin (1996).
2Gruber and Wise point out that, in any one country, marginal implicit rates vary with
earnings, age, calendar year, and other variables.  For a person of age t in the early 1990's, where
t is between the early retirement age (age 60 in 9 of the 11 countries they study) and 69, they
The purpose of my report is not to conduct a detailed statistical analysis, but merely to highlight
the empirical regularities relevant to a theory of unions and publicly induced retirement.  The most
conspicuous, and theoretically most relevant, regularity is that implicit earnings tax rates are
highest for the elderly.
I.A Public Policies Encourage Retirement
As of 1995, over 100 countries had public pension programs.
1  Among the 88 of those
countries reporting to the U.S. Social Security Administration sufficient detail of their public
pension benefit formulas, 75% pay pension benefits in such a way as to discourage work by its
elderly citizens.  The most typical means by which benefit formulas induced retirement is
remarkably transparent: retirement is a necessary condition for receiving public pension benefits,
and no credit is given to those who decide to retire later and collect benefits for fewer years.  Other
countries had more complicated benefit formulas extending some less-than-actuariarily fair credits
to those who delay retirement, or allowing employed elderly to collect partial benefits, or both (the
case for U.S. Social Security for elderly aged 65-69).  But the more complicated formulas have
much the same effect as the simple one: elderly labor income is implicitly taxed.
At least in higher income countries, the rates of implicit taxation are enormous.  Although
an exact calculation of marginal tax rates is complicated due to nonlinearities and other details of
benefit formulas, the reason for the high rates is simple: the elderly must retire to obtain full
benefits and full benefits are typically a very large fraction of the earnings enjoyed if one does not
retire.  Gruber and Wise (1999, Table 1, based on even more detailed computations of their
coauthors) attempt to quantify the rates of implicit taxation for 11 countries.  According to their
calculations for the early 1990's, the “typical” implicit tax rate for “someone of retirement age”
ranges from roughly 20% for Japan, U.S., and Canada, to more than 80% for Belgium and the
Netherlands.
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compute for a worker of median earnings the present value of public pension benefits foregone
by delaying retirement  one year, and express it as a fraction of earnings (after income and
payroll taxes) for that year, a fraction Jt which can be interpreted as an implicit tax rate.  They
sum Jt between the early retirement age and t = 69, and I divide their sum by the number of
years in the sum (10 years are in the sum for 9 of the 11 countries they study) to arrive at the
“typical” implicit tax rate for “someone of retirement age” reported in the text.
Another way to appreciate the quantitative significance of the implicit taxation of elderly
labor income by public pension programs is to notice the prevalence of 100%(!) marginal tax rates.
Mulligan (1998) discusses in some detail a number of examples, including U.S. Social Security
benefit formulas between 1939 and 1971, under which retirees lost all of their Social Security benefit
if their earnings exceeded a rather low earnings limit by even one dollar.  Other American examples
of 100% marginal tax rates can be found prior to the Social Security Act in U.S. state administered
Old Age Assistance programs, which typically implicitly taxed earnings at a 100 percent rate (Joint
Committee 1966, pp. 26-27).  Spain has one of several international examples, where their elderly
are not allowed to collect a government pension if they earn any labor income at all (Boldrin et al
1997 p. 16, SSA 1997 p. 330) and those benefits are typically close to or more than what the
pensioner would have earned after taxes (Boldrin et al 1997).
Perhaps these implicit taxes are not distortionary, because they are not enforced or because
other government regulations prohibit people from changing their behavior in response to them?
There are two reasons to be skeptical of such a claim.  First, Gruber and Wise (1999) show that
retirement behavior is highly correlated across countries and across age groups with the measured
incentives.  Second, the stated purpose of the implicit tax provision is often to discourage
retirement (Sala-i-Martin 1996; Gruber and Wise 1999, p. 31).
Pensions are not the only public programs encouraging retirement.  “Disability insurance”
and “unemployment insurance” programs “essentially provide early retirement benefits before the
official social security early retirement age” (Gruber and Wise 1999, p. 9) in many countries.  Tax-
favoring company pensions, mandatory defined benefit company pensions, and public health
insurance are some other government policies that may substantially induce retirement.
I.B Marginal (Implicit + Explicit) Tax Rates are Highest for the Old
Perhaps it is unsurprising that public policies discourage work, since governments need toMonopoly Unionism? - 4
3For international examples, see SSA (1995) and Gruber and Wise (1999).  Leimer (1998,
pp. 16-17) reports results for the American DI program.
raise revenue, or may want to assist the poor.  But another feature of public pension programs, and
government policy in general, is that elderly work is discouraged more than young work.  Hence,
while payroll tax rates are paid by young and old workers and can be large in many countries –
more than 10% in the U.S. and nearly 50% in Egypt, Italy, and the Netherlands – public pension
benefit formulas in many countries substantially reduce the incentive to work beyond its reduction
due to payroll and income taxation.
Income taxes, payroll taxes, and public pension benefits are not the only public policies
discouraging work.  Minimum wages, unemployment compensation, welfare payments, workweek
restrictions, on other policies have the effect of discouraging work, and a full analysis of public
policy and work incentives would include detailed calculations of the effects of these programs.
However, two observations strongly suggest that, taken together, the various public policies tax
elderly labor income at much higher marginal rates.  First of all, a number of these programs – such
as unemployment and welfare – affect work incentives for both elderly and young people.  Often
unemployment and welfare payments are most generous for the elderly, and implicitly tax elderly
labor earnings at higher rates.  Indeed, the unemployment insurance programs in Belgium, Finland,
and other countries are hard to distinguish from public pension programs in terms of their
intergenerational incidence and their age profile of marginal tax rates.
3  Second, it seems that,
because of public pension programs, the prevalence of 100% and near 100% marginal tax rates is
much higher among the elderly than among the young (as a consequence of tax and other policies)
and, as a result, work is so much more prevalent among the young.
I.C Young Workers Pay for Public Pensions
Public retirement funds are almost always paid for by the young.  It is rare for a country
to have a fully-funded program (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999), so that most Social Security
programs redistribute from younger generations to older ones.  In fact, the cross-cohort
redistribution is much more important than redistribution in any other dimension by these
programs (e.g., Auerbach et al 1992, Auerbach et al 1999, Jensen and Raffelhuschen 1997, Hagemann
and John 1997, House Committee 1996 table 1-50).Monopoly Unionism? - 5
4I measure “union importance” by the fraction of the population that is a member of a
union (OECD 1991), and the importance of centralized bargaining (the indices reported by
I.D Pensions Designed this Way Have Existed for Many Decades
For decades, Social Security benefit formulas have implicitly taxed labor income of the
elderly.  To prove this, I construct a data set for the years 1958 and 1975 like Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin’s (1999a) 1995 data based on SSA reports (SSA, various issues).  It was somewhat more
common internationally in 1958 and 1975 for benefit formulas to induce retirement with the simpler
formula making retirement a necessary condition for receiving public pension benefits (eg., the
U.S. did so in 1958, but not in 1995).  Delayed retirement credits and gradual phaseout of benefits
with earnings were more common in 1995, so it might be said that retirement was induced more
dramatically in 1958 and 1975.  However, the size of the benefit foregone by the elderly worker has
grown over time relative to what a retiree would have earned, so in this sense benefit formulas
induce retirement more in recent years.  More research is required to determine exactly how the
incentive to retire has changed over the years in various countries, but it is clear that public pension
benefits have for decades provided an important incentive to retire.
I.E Pensions Designed this Way can be Found in Countries of Various Sizes and under Various Forms
of Organized Labor
Sala-i-Martin (1996) has shown how social security benefit formulas encourage retirement
in countries as varied as the Bahamas, Belgium, Egypt, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United
States.  It is relevant for the monopoly unionism model how these incentives vary with (a) the size
of the economy (a proxy for the elasticity of demand for domestic labor) and (b) the importance
of organized labor.  The Gruber-Wise tax rate calculations suggest that retirement incentives are
largest in relatively small economies like Belgium and the Netherlands, and relatively small in larger
economies like those of Germany and the United States.  There may be a correlation across high
income countries between retirement incentives and the importance of national unions (both union
importance and implicit tax rates are relatively low in the United States while both are relatively
high in Belgium), although high implicit tax rates are found in countries with average or less than
average union importance (eg., Netherlands) and relatively low implicit rates found in countries
with important unions (eg., Sweden).
4Monopoly Unionism? - 6
Summers et al 1993, Data Appendix Table I).  Sweden is highly unionized on both measures,
and the U.S. much less unionized on both.  Belgium has a relatively high percentage unionized,
and is slightly above average on the collective bargaining scale.  Netherlands is well below
average in terms of union density and slightly below average in terms of the centralized
bargaining indices.
5The utility functions uy and uo have the usual properties: increasing in consumption,
decreasing in labor, and concave.  For simplicity, I do not explicitly model age, income, or
preference heterogeneity among the young or among the old.  The main lessons of the analysis
would obtain in models complicated in such dimensions.  The reader can interpret age
heterogeneity in this simple model, say, by letting uo denote the present discounted utility
enjoyed between age 50 and death, and Lo as the fraction of years worked between age 50 and
death.  “Publicly induced retirement” means that public policy does more to reduce the fraction
of time worked at age 50 than before age 50.  The reader can interpret preference heterogeneity
together with more “realistic” discrete individual labor supply decisions as does Mulligan (1999):
uo is the utility of a representative old person and Lo is the fraction of old people who work. 
Under this interpretation, “publicly induced retirement” means that public policy does more to
reduce the fraction people aged 50+ who work.
W "uo(co, Lo), (1 & ")uy(cy, Ly), "
II.  Optimal Age-Employment Policy for a Monopoly Union II.  Optimal Age-Employment Policy for a Monopoly Union
Consider an economy where output is produced according to a constant returns production
function    with three inputs (each with positive marginal products): young F (1 & ")Ly, " Lo, K
union labor (1-")Ly, old union labor "Lo, and nonunion inputs K.  Nonunion inputs include capital
and nonunion labor of various types, but disaggregating the nonunion inputs is not of particular
interest here.  " is the fraction of union membership that is old; total union membership is
normalized to 1.  The union cares about the utility uy of a representative young union member, the
utility uo of a representative old union member according to the quasiconcave “welfare function”
W:
5
where ci is the average consumption of a union member of type i (i = o,y).  W is increasing in its
first two arguments and includes as special cases the utilitarian objective (W = "uo + (1-")uy), and
welfare functions that weight one age group more heavily than another.  The utility functions uy
and uo can be different for young and old workers.Monopoly Unionism? - 7
max
cy, co, Ly, Lo
W "uo(co, Lo), (1 & ")uy(cy, Ly), "
s.t. "co % (1 & ")cy # F (1 & ")Ly, " Lo, K
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Since the purpose of this paper is to show how various government policies benefit labor, the
relevant concept of a “union” is the group of labor that is represented by coordinated pressure on
government.  The “union” might literally be a national union such as the AFL-CIO, or a national
collective bargaining unit, or all labor (eg., because a national union feels that in political affairs it
should represent the interest of all workers including nonmembers).  I prefer the “all labor”
interpretation of “union” and hereafter refer to the union as “labor”.  I point out that, although the
various interpretations might be quite different for the American labor market, they are quite
similar in a number of European countries.  Furthermore, my results are consistent with a union
objective that puts different weights on the utility of various types of workers (eg., putting less
weight on nonmembers).
II.A Optimal Policy with Lump Sum Taxation of Nonunion Factors
Suppose for a moment that labor had complete control over the allocation of inputs and
outputs in the economy.  The allocation optimal from labor’s point of view solves:
For the moment, I assume that the optimal allocation is labor is strictly positive for both types of
workers.  Two of the first order conditions for this problem equate a union member’s marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) to the marginal product of labor:Monopoly Unionism? - 8
6If leisure is a normal good, policy will decrease the labor supply of union members, but
this is only a wealth effect.
F (1 & ")Ly, " Lo, K ’ [wy (1 & ") Ly % wo " Lo] % MF
MK
K (1) (1)
where I have defined wi to be the marginal product of type i union labor.  In words, the optimal
policy from labor’s point of view does not discourage work (ie, drive a wedge between the marginal
product and MRS) for any of its members. 
In effect, labor’s goals are achieved by levying lump sum taxes on nonunion members (eg.,
nonunion workers, owners of capital) and paying lump sum subsidies to union members, without
driving a wedge between MRS and marginal product of labor for union members.
6  Of course, it
follows that the “lump sum tax” model is inconsistent with a wedge between MRS and marginal
product that is larger for old workers and thereby cannot explain why public policy induces
retirement.
If zero labor were optimal for one or both types of workers, then there could be a difference
between MRS and marginal product for those workers with L = 0.  However, the MRS exceeds the
marginal product of labor for such allocations, and it cannot be said that the optimal policy
discourages work except via a wealth effect.
II.B Optimal Monopoly Unionism – Production Weakly Separable in Labor
Some (eg., Leontief 1946, Freeman and Medoff 1984, MaCurdy and Pencavel 1986) have
suggested that unions do achieve their objectives in labor-management negotiations without
significantly distorting the supply of labor. And perhaps unions can do the same in the political
negotiations that generate public policy.  But, for the sake of argument and with the hope of
explaining why public policy induces retirement, let us suppose otherwise.  In particular, suppose
that the division of output among union and nonunion factors is determined under competitive
conditions.  Euler’s Theorem provides a convenient analytical characterization:
where the term in square brackets is labor compensation and the last term is compensation of
nonunion factors.Monopoly Unionism? - 9
7which implies that the labor aggregation function L is homothetic.
8For simplicity, it is assumed that none of the union members own any of the nonunion
input K.  The result of this paper – that the marginal tax labor income rates that are optimal
from the perspective of a monopoly union should not depend on age – does not depend on this
assumption.
output ’ F L((1 & ")Ly, " Lo), K (2) (2)





cy, co, Ly, Lo, L
W "uo(co, Lo), (1 & ")uy(cy, Ly), "
s.t. "co % (1 & ")cy # LG(L)
L ’ L "Lo, (1 & ")Ly
(4) (4)
That “compensation is determined under competitive conditions” means that nonunion
factors must be paid KMF/MK.  Even so, the union may want to decrease the quantity of labor so
as to reduce MF/MK and compensation to nonunion factors.  The is seen most easily in the case that
output is a weakly separable function of labor and nonunion inputs:
in other words, “aggregate” labor is a well-defined input to the production process although the
aggregator function L need not be linear.  It is important to note that the production function (2)
is consistent with different productivity for old and young workers, any degree of substitutability
between old and young workers (including perfect substitution), and with any degree of
substitutability between union and nonunion factors (including perfect substitution).
Assuming constant returns in (L,K),
7 Euler’s equation becomes:
The monopoly union allocates consumption and work among its members to solve:
8Monopoly Unionism? - 10
9When the demand for labor is derived from a production function like (2), the optimal
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where G is the marginal product of L (MF/ML).  Notice above that solutions to the problem (4)
depend only on the production technology through the “inverse labor demand function” G(L).
Hence, the results derived from (4) apply to any other model of the labor market that has a labor
demand schedule taken as given by the monopoly union.  One relevant example of such a model
might be an open economy model where the inverse of G(L) is the demand for domestic labor by
domestic and foreign producers.
For the moment, I assume that the optimal allocation of labor is strictly positive for both
types of workers.  Two of the first order conditions for the problem (4) relate a union member’s
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) to the marginal product of labor (see below for a discussion
of the convexity of the maximization problem (4)):
The allocation optimal from labor’s point of view drives a wedge (1-J) between each union worker’s
MRS and his marginal product.  Furthermore the optimal wedge has J = 1/g, where g is the elasticity
of labor demand.
9  This is the well-known policy (Dunlop 1944; Lewis 1963, p. 32; Rees 1989, p. 67)
of the monopoly union: reducing the supply of labor increases the return to labor and can make
labor better off, even as it reduces efficiency and payments to other factors.  Labor might
implement such an allocation by enforcing work shift rules, by lobbying government to limit entry
into union occupations and industries, or by lobbying government to finance transfer payments to
workers that are funded with labor income taxes.
What is relevant for my study of retirement, however, is that the optimal wedge is the same
(in percentage terms) for all types of union labor.  In other words, if the optimal policy from labor’s
point of view involves reducing its young member’s incentive to work by J percent, then theMonopoly Unionism? - 11
10If the utility functions uy and uo satisfied Inada conditions, then it would not be optimal
for both types of workers to supply zero labor, because no worker could afford to consume.
optimal policy involves the same J percent reduction in elderly incentives to work.  Notice that my
derivation is perfectly consistent with:
• different labor supply elasticities for young and old
• different derived labor demand elasticities for young and old
• any degree of substitution in production between old and young workers
• any degree of substitution in production between labor and nonunion factors
• a welfare function that weights old and young workers differently
Since the labor aggregator function L is homothetic, my derivation does assume that the aggregate
output elasticity of demand is the same for old and young labor.  It seems that this is a rather weak
assumption, since it implies that the relative demand for young and old workers is independent of
the size of the economy.  The weak separability assumption is more restrictive, and is relaxed in
Section III below.
It is important to notice that the optimal wedge is the same for young and old labor even
when young and old have very different labor supply elasticities.  This implies that the optimal
policy may involve a greater change in the quantity of one age group’s labor input because the group
supplying labor more elastically will respond more to a given marginal tax rate.  Hence, the puzzle
for the monopoly unionism model is not that the old work less, but that the old are discouraged
most from working.
(4) may not be a globally convex maximization problem.  However, for fixed L, it is convex
in the choice variables co, cy, Lo, and Ly.  Hence, first order conditions describe the allocation of labor
and consumption between old and young even if they do not fully characterize the aggregate
quantity of labor L.  It is the optimal allocation of consumption and labor – the equation of
MRSy/wy and MRSo/wo – that is of primary concern for my study of publicly induced retirement.
If zero labor were optimal for one type of worker,
10 say the old, then there could be a
difference between MRSo and wo.  However, the MRS exceeds the marginal product of labor for
such allocations, and it cannot be said that the optimal policy discourages work except via a wealth
effect.  It might even be the case that the optimal policy could be implemented with a relatively highMonopoly Unionism? - 12
11Utility functions over consumption c and efficiency units 8 are defined according to





G " Lo %
wy
G (1 & ") Ly
(or relatively low) marginal labor income tax for the old, but that is only because the old labor
supply decision is a “corner solution” and the same allocation would result if the old were taxed at
the same marginal rate as are the young.
Reminiscent of Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971) result that a benevolent social planner
optimally taxes intermediate inputs at a uniform rate, I find that the monopoly union optimally
taxes its various labor inputs at a uniform rate.  Why?  Suppose that there were a larger wedge
between MRSi and wi for older workers.  Holding fixed L and thereby union and nonunion incomes,
consumption can be reallocated to the old and leisure reallocated to the young in such a way to
make both young and old better off.  And, because L is held constant, there is no reason why
nonunion factors would be worse off if the union moved in this way to equalize the implicit tax
rates on young and old workers.
Our result can be graphically demonstrated in an Edgeworth box for the special case that
" = ½ and the labor aggregation function L is linear:
where the coefficients in the linear aggregator are computed according to the definition of the
marginal labor products wo and wy, and are independent of L.  The dimensions of the Edgeworth
box are the available consumption LG(L) and the efficiency units of labor L to be allocated between
young and old.  In the box we graph the indifference curves for young and old as a function of
consumption and efficiency units of labor.
11  Since labor is a bad, these indifference curves slope up.Monopoly Unionism? - 13
Figure 1 Figure 1 The Allocative Inefficiency of Publicly Induced Retirement
If there were a larger wedge between MRSi and wi for older workers, then older workers are willing
to supply more efficiency units than are the young in order to gain a given increment to
consumption, and young and old indifference curves cross as they do at the allocation denoted as
a hollow circle in the Edgeworth box.  Holding constant total efficiency units supplied L and total
consumption of workers LG(L), old workers can be made better off without hurting young workers
or owners of nonlabor inputs by (a) reducing young labor input by * efficiency units (* small), (b)
reducing young consumption by *MRSy/wy, (c) increasing old labor input by * efficiency units,
and (d) increasing old consumption by *MRSy/wy .  (a) and (c) guarantee that total labor input L
is held constant, while (b) and (d) guarantee that aggregate consumption is held constant.  ByMonopoly Unionism? - 14
F L((1 & ")Ly, " Lo), K ’ min{(1 & ")Ly % " Lo, K}
definition, a consumer of type i is willing to substitute consumption for efficiency units of labor
at rate MRSi/wi, so (a) and (b) imply that the young are no worse off.  The old would be no worse
off if they received *MRSo/wo more consumption, but (c) gives them *MRSy/wy which is even
better since MRSy/wy > MRSo/wo, at the hollow dot.  The solid dot in the Edgeworth box is one
such allocation that improves allocative efficiency without affecting aggregate consumption or
aggregate labor input.
This proof should also make it clear that the efficiency gains of uniformly taxing young and
old does not rely on my simplifying assumption that labor supply decisions are continuous.
Suppose, for example, that individual labor supply could only be 0 or 1.  The young are identical
in every way except their reservation wages, as are the old.  If old and young face different marginal
tax rates Jo > Jy, then the marginal old worker has a smaller ratio of MRS to marginal product than
does the marginal young worker.  If a marginal young worker were removed from his job and
replaced with wy/wo marginal old retirees, then nobody would be worse off (by definition of
“marginal” and since L is held constant) and there would be wy(Jo-Jy) units of output not consumed
by anybody, which could be divided between young and old union members making all better off.
The desirability of uniform marginal labor tax rates (rather than uniform marginal taxes)
from the point of view of labor can also be understood in terms of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies.
Additional work by some individual harms other workers since their compensation per unit labor
declines with the aggregate quantity of labor, and the right labor income tax can internalize this
effect into the individual’s utility maximizing calculus.  Notice that an individual’s effect on the
aggregate quantity of labor is proportional to his own marginal product; one hour worked by a
more productive person has a larger positive effect on aggregate labor and a greater negative effect
on the marginal product of labor.  The optimal tax per hour is therefore proportional to each
workers marginal product – the optimal tax per dollar earned is uniform across workers.
II.C “Lump of Labor” As a Special Case
Consider a special case of the production function (2):Monopoly Unionism? - 15
12If it were difficult for tax authorities to separately attribute labor product to young and
old, difficult to observe side payments between young and old workers, and distortionary
taxation of the young were the only way to make an intergenerational transfer, then it may be
desirable for elderly subsidies to also be distortionary but this reasoning cannot justify why
marginal tax rates would be greater for the old.
What makes this case interesting is not its realism, but how it represents the occasionally popular
view that there are a “fixed number of jobs” in the economy.  In particular, the demand for labor
is K and the demand for young labor is (K - "Lo); reducing old labor by one increases the demand
for young labor by exactly one.  Nonetheless, the Edgeworth box argument above is still valid –
marginal tax rates that differ across types of labor are inefficient from labor’s point of view because
some of those having jobs value them less than those not having jobs.
II.D The Scope for Redistribution Among Union Factors
If the pretax compensation accruing to young workers were wy(1-")Ly and to old workers
was wo"Lo – as it would in a marketplace where compensation were competitively determined –
lump sum taxes levied on young workers and paid to old workers (or vice versa) are needed to
attain the solution to the problem (4).  Since a person’s age is easily observed and changed only by
the passage of time, and used in benefit formulas by governments around the world, it seems that
age-specific lump sum transfers are feasible.  Age specific lump sum taxes may not be feasible in
reality, since some of those in the age group being taxed may not be able to earn enough to pay the
lump sum tax.
12  But the lack of lump sum taxes as a policy instrument cannot explain why publicly
induced retirement deviates so far from the allocative efficiency achieved in the solution to the
problem (4).  I showed in Section I how marginal tax rates highest on the old, and they are the ones
being subsidized!  The marginal tax rates on the old could be equalized with those on the young by
increasing young marginal tax rates, reducing old marginal tax rates and reducing the benefit paid
to the old conditional on L = 0.
There is an easier way to describe how the monopoly union could Pareto-improve upon the
way public policies around the world induce retirement: allow young and old workers to trade jobs
with each other, without affecting their tax liabilities or benefit amounts, at relative price wy/wo.
This is the kind of trade involved in moving from the hollow dot to the solid dot in Figure 1.  Indeed,Monopoly Unionism? - 16
max
cy, co, Ly, Lo
W "uo(co, Lo), (1 & ")uy(cy, Ly), "
s.t. "co % (1 & ")cy # "Lowo("Lo,(1&")Ly,K) % (1 & ")Lywy((1&")Ly,"Lo,K)
(6) (6)
one expects a union that operates at all efficiently to mediate some trades like this, and why
monopoly unionism cannot explain the longtime political success of policies that place such a large
and costly wedge between  MRSy/wy and MRSo/wo.
III. Optimal Monopoly Unionism – Production Not Weakly Separable III. Optimal Monopoly Unionism – Production Not Weakly Separable
To put it bluntly, because the model assumes that nonunion factors must be paid KMF/MK,
the monopoly union’s only option for stealing from the owners of nonunion factors is to raise
wages and lower the marginal product of nonunion factors (“capital”) by reducing the quantity of
labor.  I show in the previous section how, with a weakly separable production function, the
efficient way of lowering the marginal product of capital and raising the marginal product of labor
is to lower the quantity of old and young labor together so that MRSy/wy and MRSo/wo are equated.
However, a wedge between MRSy/wy and MRSo/wo is optimal with a non-weakly-separable
production function because the relative effect of the types of labor on the marginal product of
capital differs from their relative marginal products wo/wy.
Without a weakly separable production function, the “demand for labor” is not well-defined
and we must instead refer separately to the demand for young labor and the demand for old labor
in the formulation of the union optimal program.  (6) is that optimal program, and can be used to
show how the more heavily taxed (at the margin) type of labor is more complementary with the
nonunion factors and can be used more effectively to lower nonunion compensation and raise union
compensation:
where wi the marginal product of Li (MF/MLi; i = o,y).
I assume that the optimal allocation of labor is strictly positive for both types of workers.
Two of the first order conditions for the problem (6) relate a type i (i = o,y) union member’s
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The allocation optimal from labor’s point of view drives a wedge between each union worker’s
MRS and his marginal product.  The wedge is different for young workers, with type i’s implicit
marginal tax rate equal to   – work is discouraged more for that factor whose compensation
Mln wi
Mln K
is increased (in percentage terms) more by the nonunion factors.
There is another interpretation of the optimal differential wedge for young and old workers.
Young’s Theorem implies that:
In other words, the more heavily taxed labor is that which, as a fraction of its marginal product,
does the most to enhance nonunion compensation and the least to enhance union compensation.
This fraction is the same for weakly separable production functions, which is why the optimal
wedge is the same for young and old workers in that case.
Can non-weakly-separable production, together with monopoly unionism, explain why
public policy discourages elderly work more than it discourages young work?  There are three
reasons to be skeptical of such an explanation.  First, although stories might be told about
complementarities between capital and old workers, there is little direct evidence that the wages of
old workers are substantially more elastic to capital (equivalently, that capital income is
substantially more sensitive to the quantity of old labor).  Hamermesh (1993) reviews a number of
studies of the demand for labor by demographic group that offer some indirect evidence.  He
suggests that (a) the demand for labor declines with skill, and (b) changes in the relative size of
demographic groups does not have a quantitatively significant impact on the relative wages of thoseMonopoly Unionism? - 18
13Most of the age studies surveyed by Hamermesh (1993) compare “young” workers with
“middle aged” workers, not with elderly workers.
groups.  Point (a) may say something about the relative demand elasticities for old and young.  But
are the old more skilled than the young or less skilled?
13  Is an inelastic demand indicative of
complementarity with capital?  Point (b) suggests that any such difference between young and old
would still be associated with a small effect of retirement on young wages.
Second, since some types of labor are “substitutes” with capital (ie,  < 0), this
Mln wi
Mln K
explanation implies that monopoly unions would promote public policies that subsidize (at the
margin) some types of labor.  The third and most important reason to doubt that such
nonseparabilities are an important determinant of public policy is the fact that Social Security and
other public policies have young workers, rather than old workers, paying for the vast bulk of the
subsidies that discourage work among the elderly.  In the non-weakly-separable model, the main
reason why the old might be differentially taxed by the monopoly at the margin is the effect of an
old worker’s labor supply decision on other old workers.
Indeed, it may even be the case, as suggested by Kremer and Thomson (1998)  that young
and old workers are complements so that old workers work pay old retirees for not working and
young workers for reducing their wage!  This would be true even if the complementarity between
young and old were weak and the complementarity between capital and old strong.  Take the
extreme: F((1-")Ly, min{"Lo,K}), with F12 positive but small.  Lowering old labor below K means
that old labor gets all of capital’s income, and lowers the marginal product of young labor.  Induced
retirement tremendously benefits old labor, which is why it might be encouraged with a high
marginal tax rate, but it harms young labor.
Perhaps publicly induced retirement paid for by the young can be understood as a monopoly
union’s combined response of nonseparabilities in production and excessive political power by the
old (ie, that uo receives more weight in the social welfare function W)?  Powerful old might explain
why young rather than old workers pay for induced retirement even though it is the old workers
who enjoy the benefits of induced retirement (namely, high wages), but it also predicts that old
workers would also enjoy substantial subsidies.  It also leaves the power of the elderly unexplained.Monopoly Unionism? - 19
14As derived in section II, the optimal marginal tax rate is zero if lump sum taxation of
capital is feasible.
15Essentially, an age group’s union density determines how an age group’s representative
utility enters the social welfare function (4).
IV. What if Union Density Varies with Age? IV. What if Union Density Varies with Age?
Taken literally, my Edgeworth box and related arguments against differential marginal
taxation by age presumes that the union represents both young and old workers.  How do the
predictions of the monopoly union model differ if union density varies with age?
The model (4) implies that old and young union members should face the same marginal
tax rates.  But should union workers and nonunion workers face the same marginal tax rates?
There are two forces at work.  First, nonunion workers contribute to the supply of labor and
thereby affect the compensation of union labor, nonunion labor, and other nonunion factors
(“capital”).  Second, the union objective (4) does not include the utility of the nonunion members.
We have already shown that uniform marginal taxation is optimal regardless of the relative weight
enjoyed by the various types of labor in the welfare function, because distributional objectives are
achieved in the optimal policy with lump sum taxes and transfers.  So, if feasible, nonunion labor
should be taxed at the same marginal rate as union labor and, in addition, pay lump sum taxes to
finance lump sum transfers to union labor.
14
In other words, optimal policy from the union’s point of view has marginal tax rates that
are uniform by age and union status, but lump sum taxes that vary by age and union status.  If lump
sum taxes cannot be levied on nonunion labor, then optimal income tax rates on nonunion labor
could be higher, since they would serve the dual purpose of discouraging work and redistributing
from nonunion labor to union labor.  And, from the union’s point of view, there is no reason for
young nonunion labor to be taxed at different rates than old nonunion labor.
Suppose that it is feasible to vary lump sum taxes and marginal tax rates by age, but not by
union status.  Then there is another reason to levy lump sum taxes on one age group in order to
finance lump sum transfers for the other – because age is a proxy for union status.
15 But even in this
case, optimal marginal tax rates do not vary with age.
In summary, differential marginal tax rates by age are optimal only when neither lump sum
taxation by age nor by union status is feasible.  Even so, the purpose is to redistribute income fromMonopoly Unionism? - 20
those facing the high marginal tax rates to those facing the low rates.  Hence, even if the old were
less likely to be union members, the monopoly union model cannot simultaneously explain the high
marginal tax rates for, and generous treatment of, the elderly by public pension programs.
V. Conclusions V. Conclusions
Productive inefficiency – failure of marginal rates of substitution to be equated with
marginal products – is the essence of the monopoly unionism model.  But allocative inefficiency –
failure of marginal rates of substitution to be equated for different union workers – is not.  Because
public pension programs impose positive and much higher marginal tax rates on the elderly, publicly
induced retirement is a case of both productive and allocative inefficiency, and therefore not so
easily explained by monopoly unionism.
While it does not seem that monopoly unionism can explain publicly induced retirement,
I do not claim that unions do not or should not support publicly induced retirement.  After all,
many have argued that the monopoly union does not explain much union behavior.  Freeman and
Medoff (1984) suggest that, in negotiations with management and perhaps also in politics (see their
Chapter 13), unions push for policies that enhance labor market efficiency.  So, if induced
retirement is efficiency enhancing as it is in the model economies of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978)
or Sala-i-Martin (1996), union support of public policies that induce retirement might be
understandable.  Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a) suggest that retirement partly explains the
political success of the elderly, and that unions might be understood as old-age lobbies supporting
induced retirement and other subsidies for the elderly.
VI.  Appendix: Monopoly Unionism with Habit Formation and Human Capital VI.  Appendix: Monopoly Unionism with Habit Formation and Human Capital
The main text studies allocative efficiency in a static model, but the main implication that
old and young labor should be taxed at uniform rates can be derived in dynamic models as well.
The purpose of this appendix is to study allocative efficiency when the labor supply decision is a
life cycle one because time worked might be habit forming, fatiguing, or facilitate the accumulation
of human capital.  I therefore abstract from, and leave to further research, other interesting
dynamic issues such as the admittance of new members to the union, heterogeneity among unionMonopoly Unionism? - 21











members in desired savings rates, the effect of policy on the long run supply of nonunion factors,
etc.
Time is indexed t = 0, 1, 2, ..., 4.  I assume that union membership is constant over time and
across cohorts.  The union objective is the discounted average utility of its current and future
membership, and the discount factor $ for union objective is the same as for each member’s own
utility function.  In order to incorporate the possibility of habit formation in labor supply, I allow
the utility of the date t old to depend on the labor supplied when young, in addition to consumption
and labor supplied when old.  This allows for the possibility of fatigue (more labor supply when
young raises the marginal disutility of work when old), or habit formation (more labor supply when
young lowers the marginal disutility of work when old) in utility.  Utility functions can also vary
across cohorts.
The union takes as given an aggregate demand for its labor Lt at each date t, the inverse of
which is Gt(Lt; Lt-1,Lt-2,...,L0).  This is as in the static model, except that the union accounts for the
possible effects of current labor supply of future labor demand.  The aggregate quantity of labor
is a function of young and old labor as in the static model, except that the contribution of an hour
worked by old person i to aggregate labor depends on the amount he worked when young:
where the first argument of the function Lt is aggregate date t old labor input, the second argument
is aggregate date t young labor input, and the function h captures the effect of youth labor on old
age productivity.  This allows for the possibility of fatigue and/or human capital accumulation in
production.
Labor’s optimal allocation solves the problem:Monopoly Unionism? - 22
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where I have normalized cohort size to one and, as in the static model, require the union to treat all
members of the same cohort identically.  Aggregate consumption by labor cannot exceed labor
income period by period although, since current labor supply affects future labor demand,
“aggregate savings” might be achieved by working more in the current period in order to enhance
labor demand in future periods.  I leave it to the reader to show that allowing for other forms of
aggregate savings would not affect the optimality of uniform labor taxation.
As for the static model (4), the choice of aggregate labor Lt may not be a convex choice
problem.  However, with enough concavity in the utility functions and the function h, the allocation
of labor between old and young for a given sequence {Lt} is a convex problem.  The first order
conditions describing the allocation are:
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s.t. cy,t % Rtco,t%1 # Tt % (1 & Jy,t)Ly,twy,t % Rt(1 & Jo,t%1)Lo,t%1wo,t%1(Ly,t)
and where 8t and µt are the Lagrange multipliers on the date t versions of the first and second
constraints in the problem (A-2), respectively.
As compared to the corresponding conditions for the static model, there are two differences:
(1) the young’s marginal rate of labor-leisure substitution includes not only the current marginal
disutility of youth leisure but also any old age marginal disutility of youth leisure, and (2) the price
of youth leisure includes not only the after-tax date t marginal product of labor but also the
discounted after-tax marginal effect of youth labor on old age labor product.  However, even for
this more complex dynamic economy, it is easy to show that the labor-optimal allocation can be
decentralized with age-independent marginal labor income tax rates.
Decentralizing the Labor-Optimal Allocation
The basic claim in my paper is that the labor optimal allocation can be implemented with
labor income taxes and transfers, and that the optimal marginal tax rates are independent of age.
To prove this, consider a young individual making lifetime plans at date t for consumption and labor
supply.  He may receive lump sum transfers in the amount Tt (Tt < 0 if a lump sum tax) and
anticipates his labor income being taxed at rates Jy,t and Jo,t+1 when young and old, respectively.  He
recognizes that his youth labor supply affects his old wage rate according to the function wo,t+1(Ly,t).
Although aggregate borrowing and lending is not feasible, an individual young at date t may borrow
or lend with other individuals in his cohort at a single interest rate.  $Rt is the interest rate factor
implied by this interest rate.  The optimal life cycle plan for a date t individual therefore solves:Monopoly Unionism? - 24
MRSo,t%1 ’ wo,t%1(1 & Jo,t%1)
MRSy,t ’ wy,t(1 & Jy,t) % wo,t%1(1 & Jo,t%1)$Lo,t%1
Muo,t%1/Mc
Muc,t/Mc
all t ’ 0, ￿, 4
(A-6) (A-6)
Jy,t ’ Jt ’ Jo,t
Among the first order conditions of the individual’s problem (these are necessary for optimality
with enough concavity in the utility functions and the function h):
where I have used the same definitions (A-4).  (A-5) is also used, but it is no longer a definition.
(A-4) is instead an implication of pretax compensation’s being competitively determined in an
economy with labor product determined by (A-1).  Notice that, from the perspective of an
individual worker making his life cycle plan, the only dependence of his old age wage on his old age
product is through the term h() because he neglects the effect of his decisions on the economy’s
marginal product of old labor (the first two terms on the right hand side of the equations (A-5)).
Comparing (A-3) and (A-6), we see that individual decisions are consistent with an optimal
plan for the monopoly union only if marginal tax rates are independent of age:
In general, marginal tax rates must vary over time in order for individual decisions to be consistent
with an optimal plan for the monopoly union.
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